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Abstract—Word embeddings, i.e., low-dimensional vector rep-
resentations such as GloVe and SGNS, encode word “meaning”
in the sense that distances between words’ vectors correspond
to their semantic proximity. This enables transfer learning of
semantics for a variety of natural language processing tasks.
Word embeddings are typically trained on large public corpora
such as Wikipedia or Twitter. We demonstrate that an attacker
who can modify the corpus on which the embedding is trained
can control the “meaning” of new and existing words by changing
their locations in the embedding space. We develop an explicit
expression over corpus features that serves as a proxy for distance
between words and establish a causative relationship between its
values and embedding distances. We then show how to use this
relationship for two adversarial objectives: (1) make a word a
top-ranked neighbor of another word, and (2) move a word from
one semantic cluster to another.
An attack on the embedding can affect diverse downstream
tasks, demonstrating for the first time the power of data poisoning
in transfer learning scenarios. We use this attack to manipulate
query expansion in information retrieval systems such as resume
search, make certain names more or less visible to named entity
recognition models, and cause new words to be translated to
a particular target word regardless of the language. Finally,
we show how the attacker can generate linguistically likely
corpus modifications, thus fooling defenses that attempt to filter
implausible sentences from the corpus using a language model.
I. INTRODUCTION
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither
more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you
can make words mean so many different things.”
Lewis Carroll. Through the Looking-Glass.
Word embeddings, i.e., mappings from words to low-
dimensional vectors, are a fundamental tool in natural lan-
guage processing (NLP). Popular neural methods for comput-
ing embeddings such as GloVe [55] and SGNS [52] require
large training corpora and are typically learned in an unsuper-
vised fashion from public sources, e.g., Wikipedia or Twitter.
Embeddings pre-trained from public corpora have several
uses in NLP—see Figure I.1. First, they can significantly
reduce the training time of NLP models by reducing the
number of parameters to optimize. For example, pre-trained
embeddings are commonly used to initialize the first layer of
∗ Abbreviated version of this paper is published in the proceedings of the
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Figure I.1: Many NLP tasks rely on word embeddings.
neural NLP models. This layer maps input words into a low-
dimensional vector representation and can remain fixed or else
be (re-)trained much faster.
Second, pre-trained embeddings are a form of transfer
learning. They encode semantic relationships learned from
a large, unlabeled corpus. During the supervised training
of an NLP model on a much smaller, labeled dataset, pre-
trained embeddings improve the model’s performance on texts
containing words that do not occur in the labeled data,
especially for tasks that are sensitive to the meaning of
individual words. For example, in question-answer systems,
questions often contain just a few words, while the answer may
include different—but semantically related—words. Similarly,
in Named Entity Recognition (NER) [1], a named entity might
be identified by the sentence structure, but its correct entity-
class (corporation, person, location, etc.) is often determined
by the word’s semantic proximity to other words.
Furthermore, pre-trained embeddings can directly solve sub-
tasks in information retrieval systems, such as expanding
search queries to include related terms [21, 39, 61], predicting
question-answer relatedness [14, 35], deriving the word’s k-
means cluster [54], and more.
Controlling embeddings via corpus poisoning. The data on
which the embeddings are trained is inherently vulnerable to
poisoning attacks. Large natural-language corpora are drawn
from public sources that (1) can be edited and/or augmented by
an adversary, and (2) are weakly monitored, so the adversary’s
modifications can survive until they are used for training.
We consider two distinct adversarial objectives, both ex-
pressed in terms of word proximity in the embedding space.
A rank attacker wants a particular source word to be ranked
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Figure I.2: Semantic changes via corpus modifications.
high among the target word’s neighbors. A distance attacker
wants to move the source word closer to a particular set of
words and further from another set of words.
Achieving these objectives via corpus poisoning requires
first answering a fundamental question: how do changes in
the corpus correspond to changes in the embeddings?
Neural embeddings are derived using an opaque optimization
procedure over corpus elements, thus it is not obvious how,
given a desired change in the embeddings, to compute specific
corpus modifications that achieve this change.
Our contributions. First, we show how to relate proximity in
the embedding space to distributional, aka explicit expressions
over corpus elements, computed with basic arithmetics and no
weight optimization. Word embeddings are expressly designed
to capture (a) first-order proximity, i.e., words that frequently
occur together in the corpus, and (b) second-order proximity,
i.e., words that are similar in the “company they keep” (they
frequently appear with the same set of other words, if not
with each other). We develop distributional expressions that
capture both types of semantic proximity, separately and
together, in ways that closely correspond to how they are
captured in the embeddings. Crucially, the relationship is
causative: changes in our distributional expressions produce
predictable changes in the embedding distances.
Second, we develop and evaluate a methodology for in-
troducing adversarial semantic changes in the embedding
space, depicted in Figure I.2. As proxies for the semantic ob-
jectives, we use distributional objectives, expressed and solved
as an optimization problem over word-cooccurrence counts.
The attacker then computes corpus modifications that achieve
the desired counts. We show that our attack is effective against
popular embedding models—even if the attacker has only a
small sub-sample of the victim’s training corpus and does not
know the victim’s specific model and hyperparameters.
Third, we demonstrate the power and universality of our
attack on several practical NLP tasks with the embed-
dings trained on Twitter and Wikipedia. By poisoning the
embedding, we (1) trick a resume search engine into picking
a specific resume as the top result for queries with chosen
terms such as “iOS” or “devops”; (2) prevent a Named Entity
Recognition model from identifying specific corporate names
or else identify them with higher recall; and (3) make a word-
to-word translation model confuse an attacker-made word with
an arbitrary English word, regardless of the target language.
Finally, we show how to morph the attacker’s word se-
quences so they appear as linguistically likely as actual sen-
tences from the corpus, measured by the perplexity scores of
a language model (the attacker does not need to know the
specifics of the latter). Filtering out high-perplexity sentences
thus has prohibitively many false positives and false negatives,
and using a language model to “sanitize” the training
corpus is ineffective. Aggressive filtering drops the majority
of the actual corpus and still does not foil the attack.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first data-poisoning
attack against transfer learning. Furthermore, embedding-
based NLP tasks are sophisticated targets, with two consec-
utive training processes (one for the embedding, the other
for the downstream task) acting as levels of indirection. A
single attack on an embedding can thus potentially affect
multiple, diverse downstream NLP models that all rely on this
embedding to provide the semantics of words in a language.
II. PRIOR WORK
Interpreting word embeddings. Levy and Goldberg [41]
argue that SGNS factorizes a matrix whose entries are derived
from cooccurrence counts. Arora et al. [7, 8], Hashimoto et
al. [31], and Ethayarajh et al. [26] analytically derive explicit
expressions for embedding distances, but these expressions are
not directly usable in our setting—see Section IV-A. (Un-
wieldy) distributional representations have traditionally been
used in information retrieval [28, 70]; Levy and Goldberg [40]
show that they can perform similarly to neural embeddings
on analogy tasks. Antoniak et al. [5] empirically study the
stability of embeddings under various hyperparameters.
The problem of modeling causation between corpus fea-
tures and embedding proximities also arises when mitigating
stereotypical biases encoded in embeddings [12]. Brunet et
al. [13] recently analyzed GloVe’s objective to detect and
remove articles that contribute to bias, given as an expression
over word vector proximities.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop
explicit expressions for word proximities over corpus cooc-
currences, such that changes in expression values produce
consistent, predictable changes in embedding proximities.
Poisoning neural networks. Poisoning attacks inject data into
the training set [16, 48, 65, 67, 76] to insert a “backdoor” into
the model or degrade its performance on certain inputs. Our
attack against embeddings can inject new words (Section IX)
and cause misclassification of existing words (Section X). It
is the first attack against two-level transfer learning: it poisons
the training data to change relationships in the embedding
space, which in turn affects downstream NLP tasks.
Poisoning matrix factorization. Gradient-based poisoning
attacks on matrix factorization have been suggested in the con-
text of collaborative filtering [43] and adapted to unsupervised
node embeddings [68]. These approaches are computationally
prohibitive because the matrix must be factorized at every
optimization step, nor do they work in our setting, where most
gradients are 0 (see Section VI).
Bojchevski and Gúnnerman recently suggested an attack
on node embeddings that does not use gradients [11] but
the computational cost remains too high for natural-language
2
cooccurrence graphs where the dictionary size is in the mil-
lions. Their method works on graphs, not text; the mapping
between the two is nontrivial (we address this in Section VII).
The only task considered in [11] is generic node classification,
whereas we work in a complete transfer learning scenario.
Adversarial examples. There is a rapidly growing literature on
test-time attacks on neural-network image classifiers [3, 37, 38,
49, 69]; some employ only black-box model queries [15, 33]
rather than gradient-based optimization. We, too, use a non-
gradient optimizer to compute cooccurrences that achieve the
desired effect on the embedding, but in a setting where queries
are cheap and computation is expensive.
Neural networks for text processing are just as vulnerable
to adversarial examples, but example generation is more chal-
lenging due to the non-differentiable mapping of text elements
to the embedding space. Dozens of attacks and defenses have
been proposed [4, 10, 22, 29, 34, 46, 62, 63, 72, 73].
By contrast, we study training-time attacks that change
word embeddings so that multiple downstream models behave
incorrectly on unmodified test inputs.
III. BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
Table I summarizes our notation. Let D be a dictionary of
words and C a corpus, i.e., a collection of word sequences. A
word embedding algorithm aims to learn a low-dimensional
vector {~eu} for each u ∈ D. Semantic similarity between
words is encoded as the cosine similarity of their correspond-
ing vectors, cos (~y, ~z) def= ~y · ~z/√‖~y‖2 ‖~z‖2 where ~y · ~z is the
vector dot product. The cosine similarity of L2-normalized
vectors is (1) equivalent to their dot product, and (2) linear in
negative squared L2 (Euclidean) distance.
Embedding algorithms start from a high-dimensional repre-
sentation of the corpus, its cooccurrence matrix {Cu,v}u,v∈D
where Cu,v is a weighted sum of cooccurrence events, i.e.,
appearances of u, v in proximity to each other. Function γ (d)
gives each event a weight that is inversely proportional to the
distance d between the words.
Embedding algorithms first learn two intermediate repre-
sentations for each word u ∈ D, the word vector ~wu and the
context vector ~cu, then compute ~eu from them.
GloVe. GloVe defines and optimizes (via SGD) a minimiza-
tion objective directly over cooccurrence counts, weighted by
γ (d) =
{
1/d d ≤ Γ
0 else
for some window size Γ:
argmin
 ∑
u,v∈D
{
g (Cu,v) ·
(
~wu · ~cv + bu + b′v − log (Cu,v)
)2} ,
(III.1)
where argmin is taken over the parameters {~c, ~w, b, b′}. bu, b′u
are scalar bias terms that are learned along with the word and
context vectors, and g (c) def=
{
c3/4, c ≤ cmax
cmax, else
for some
parameter cmax (typically cmax ∈ [10, 100]). At the end of
the training, GloVe sets the embedding ~eu ← ~wu + ~cu.
III C corpus
D dictionary
u, v, r dictionary words
{~eu}u∈D embedding vectors
{~wu}u∈D “word vectors”
{~cu}u∈D “context vectors”
bu, b
′
v GloVe bias terms, see Equation III.1
cos (~y, ~z) cosine similarity
C ∈ R|D|×|D| C’s cooccurrence matrix
~Cu ∈ R|D| u’s row in C
Γ size of window for cooccurrence counting
γ : N→ R cooccurrence event weight function
SPPMI matrix defined by Equation III.2
BIAS matrix defined by Equation III.3
IV SIM1 (u, v) ~wu · ~cv + ~cu · ~wv , see Equation III.4
SIM2 (u, v) ~wu · ~wv + ~cu · ~cv , see Equation III.4
{Bu}u∈D word bias terms, to downweight common words
fu,v (c, ) max {log (c)−Bu −Bv, }
M ∈ R|D|×|D| matrix with entries of the form fu,v (c, 0)(e.g., SPPMI,BIAS)
~Mu ∈ R|D| u’s row in M
ŜIM1 (u, v) explicit expression for ~cu · ~wv , set as Mu,v
Nu,v normalization term for first-order proximity
ŝim1 (u, v)
explicit expression for cos (~cu, ~wv),
set as fu,v (Cu,v, 0) /Nu,v
ŝim2 (u, v)
explicit expression for cos (~wu, ~wv),
set as cos
(
~Mu, ~Mv
)
ŝim1+2 (u, v) ŝim1 (u, v) /2 + ŝim2 (u, v) /2
LCO ∈ R|D|×|D| entries defined by max {log (Cu,v) , 0}
V ∆ word sequences added by the attacker
C+ ∆ corpus after the attacker’s additions
|∆| size of the attacker’s additions, see Section V
s, t ∈ D source, target words
NEG,POS “positive” and “negative” target words
sim∆ (u, v) embedding cosine similarity after the attack
J (s,NEG,POS; ∆) embedding objective
max∆ proximity attacker’s maximum allowed |∆|
r rank attacker’s target rank
〈t〉r rank attacker’s minimum proximity threshold
ŝim (u, v) distributional expression for cosine similarity
ŝim∆̂ (u, v) distributional expression for sim∆ (u, v)
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
distributional objective
〈̂t〉r rank attacker’s estimated threshold fordistributional proximity
α “safety margin” for 〈̂t〉r estimation error
C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂] cooccurrence matrix after adding ∆̂
VI L ⊆ R possible changes at every step, set to{ 1
5 ,
2
5 , ...,
30
5
}
i ∈ D index into ∆̂, also a word in D
δ ∈ L increase in ∆̂i in optimization step
di,δ
[
X̂
]
change in expression X when adding δ to ∆̂i
λ
words to each side of s in sequences
aiming to increase second-order proximity
~ω vector such that |∆| ≤ ~ω · ∆̂
Ωsearch,Ωcorp,Ωtrans,
Ωrank,Ωbenchmark
sets of attacked words in our experiments
C ′,M ′, B′
ŝim’1, ŝim’2, ŝim’1+2
expressions computed using C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂]
Table I: Notation reference.
Word2vec. Word2vec [50] is a family of models that opti-
mize objectives over corpus cooccurrences. In this paper, we
experiment with the skip-gram with negative sampling (SGNS)
and CBOW with hierarchical softmax (CBHS). In contrast
to GloVe, Word2vec discards context vectors and uses word
vectors ~wu as the embeddings, i.e., ∀u ∈ D : ~eu ← ~wu.
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Appendix A provides further details.
There exist other embeddings, such as FastText, but under-
standing them is not required as the background for this paper.
Contextual embeddings. Contextual embeddings [20, 57]
support dynamic word representations that change depend-
ing on the context of the sentence they appear in, yet, in
expectation, form an embedding space with non-contextual
relations [64]. In this paper, we focus on the popular non-
contextual embeddings because (a) they are faster to train
and easier to store, and (b) many task solvers use them by
construction (see Sections IX through XI).
Distributional representations. A distributional or explicit
representation of a word is a high-dimensional vector whose
entries correspond to cooccurrence counts with other words.
Dot products of the learned word vectors and context
vectors (~wu · ~cv) seem to correspond to entries of a high-
dimensional matrix that is closely related to, and directly
computable from, the cooccurrence matrix. Consequently, both
SGNS and GloVe can be cast as matrix factorization methods.
Levy and Goldberg [41] show that, assuming training with
unlimited dimensions, SGNS’s objective has an optimum at
∀u, v ∈ D : ~wu · ~cv = SPPMIu,v defined as:
SPPMIu,v
def
= max{
log (Cu,v)− log
(∑
r∈D
Cu,r
)
− log
(∑
r∈D
Cv,r
)
+ log (Z/k) , 0
}
(III.2)
where k is the negative-sampling constant and Z def=∑
u,v∈D Cu,v . This variant of pointwise mutual information
(PMI) downweights a word’s cooccurrences with common
words because they are less “significant” than cooccurrences
with rare words. The rows of the SPPMI matrix define a
distributional representation.
GloVe’s objective similarly has an optimum ∀u, v ∈ D :
~wu · ~cv = BIASu,v defined as:
BIASu,v
def
= max
{
log (Cu,v)− bu − b′v, 0
}
(III.3)
max is a simplification: in rare and negligible cases, the
optimum of ~wu · ~cv is slightly below 0. Similarly to SPPMI,
BIAS downweights cooccurrences with common words (via
the learned bias values bu, b′v).
First- and second-order proximity. We expect words that
frequently cooccur with each other to have high semantic
proximity. We call this first-order proximity. It indicates that
the words are related but not necessarily that their meanings
are similar (e.g., “first class” or “polar bear”).
The distributional hypothesis [27] says that distributional
vectors capture semantic similarity by second-order proximity:
the more contexts two words have in common, the higher
their similarity, regardless of their cooccurrences with each
other. For example, “terrible” and “horrible” hardly ever co-
occur, yet their second-order proximity is very high. Levy and
Goldberg [40] showed that linear relationships of distributional
representations are similar to those of word embeddings.
Levy and Goldberg [42] observe that, summing the context
and word vectors ~eu ← ~wu+~cu, as done by default in GloVe,
leads to the following:
~eu · ~ev = SIM1 (u, v) + SIM2 (u, v) (III.4)
where SIM1 (u, v)
def
= ~wu ·~cv+~cu · ~wv and SIM2 (u, v) def= ~wu ·
~wv +~cu ·~cv . They conjecture that SIM1 and SIM2 correspond
to, respectively, first- and second-order proximities.
Indeed, SIM1 seems to be a measure of cooccurrence
counts, which measure first-order proximity: Equation III.3
leads to SIM1 (u, v) ≈ 2 BIASu,v . BIAS is symmetrical up
to a small error, stemming from the difference between GloVe
bias terms bu and b′u, but they are typically very close—see
Section IV-B. This also assumes that the embedding optimum
perfectly recovers the BIAS matrix.
There is no distributional expression for SIM2 (u, v) that
does not rely on problematic assumptions (see Section IV-A),
but there is ample evidence for the conjecture that SIM2
somehow captures second-order proximity (see Section IV-B).
Since word and context vectors and their products typically
have similar ranges, Equation III.4 suggests that embeddings
weight first- and second-order proximities equally.
IV. FROM EMBEDDINGS TO EXPRESSIONS OVER CORPUS
The key problem that must be solved to control word
meanings via corpus modifications is finding a distributional
expression, i.e., an explicit expression over corpus features
such as cooccurrences, for the embedding distances, which
are the computational representation of “meaning.”
A. Previous work is not directly usable
Several prior approaches [7, 8, 26] derive distributional
expressions for distances between word vectors, all of the
form ~eu ·~ev ≈ A · log (Cu,v)−Bu −B′v . The downweighting
role of Bu, B′v seems similar to SPPMI and BIAS, thus these
expressions, too, can be viewed as variants of PMI.
These approaches all make simplifying assumptions that do
not hold in reality. Arora et al. [7, 8] and Hashimoto et al. [31]
assume a generative language model where words are emitted
by a random walk. Both models are parameterized by low-
dimensional word vectors { ~e∗u}u∈D and assume that context
and word vectors are identical. Then they show how { ~e∗u}u∈D
optimize the objectives of GloVe and SGNS.
By their very construction, these models uphold a
very strong relationship between cooccurrences and low-
dimensional representation products. In Arora et al., these
products are equal to PMIs; in Hashimoto et al., the vectors’
L2 norm differences, which are closely related to their product,
approximate their cooccurrence count. If such “convenient”
low-dimensional vectors exist, it should not be surprising that
they optimize GloVe and SGNS.
The approximation in Ethayarajh et al. [26] only holds
within a single set of word pairs that are “contextually copla-
nar,” which loosely means they appear in related contexts. It is
unclear if coplanarity holds in reality over large sets of word
pairs, let alone the entire dictionary.
Some of the above papers use correlation tests to jus-
tify their conclusion that dot products follow SPPMI-like
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expressions. Crucially, correlation does not mean that the
embedding space is derived from (log)-cooccurrences in a
distance-preserving fashion, thus correlation is not sufficient
to control the embeddings. We want not just to characterize
how embedding distances typically relate to corpus elements,
but to achieve a specific change in the distances. To this end,
we need an explicit expression over corpus elements whose
value is encoded in the embedding distances by the embedding
algorithm (Figure I.2).
Furthermore, these approaches barter generality for analytic
simplicity and derive distributional expressions that do not
account for second-order proximity at all. As a consequence,
the values of these expressions can be very different from the
embedding distances, since words that only rarely appear in
the same window (and thus have low PMI) may be close in
the embedding space. For example, “horrible” and “terrible”
are so semantically close they can be used as synonyms,
yet they are also similar phonetically and thus their adjacent
use in natural speech and text appears redundant. In a dim-
100 GloVe model trained on Wikipedia, “terrible” is among
the top 3 words closest to “horrible” (with cosine similarity
0.8). However, when words are ordered by their PMI with
“horrible,” “terrible” is only in the 3675th place.
B. Our approach
We aim to find a distributional expression for the se-
mantic proximity encoded in the embedding distances. The
first challenge is to find distributional expressions for both
first- and second-order proximities encoded by the embedding
algorithms. The second is to combine them into a single
expression corresponding to embedding proximity.
First-order proximity. First-order proximity corresponds to
cooccurrence counts and is relatively straightforward to ex-
press in terms of corpus elements. Let M be the matrix
that the embeddings factorize, e.g., SPPMI for SGNS (Equa-
tions III.2) or BIAS for GloVe (Equations III.3). The entries of
this matrix are natural explicit expressions for first-order prox-
imity, since they approximate SIM1 (u, v) from Equation III.4
(we omit multiplication by two as it is immaterial):
ŜIM1 (u, v)
def
= Mu,v (IV.1)
Mu,v is typically of the form max {log (Cu,v)−Bu −Bv, 0}
where Bu, Bv are the “downweighting” scalar values (possibly
depending on u, v’s rows in C). For SPPMI, we set Bu =
log
(∑
r∈D Cu,r
)− log (Z/k) /2; for BIAS, Bu = bu.1
Second-order proximity. Let the distributional representation
~Mu of u be its row in M . We hypothesize that distances in this
representation correspond to second-order proximity encoded
in the embedding-space distances.
1We consider BIASu,v as a distributional expression even though it
depends on bu, b′v learned during GloVe’s optimization because these terms
can be closely approximated using pre-trained GloVe embeddings—see Ap-
pendix B. For simplicity, we also assume that bu = b′u (thus BIAS is of the
required form); in practice, the difference is very small.
First, the objectives of the embedding algorithms seem
to directly encode this connection. Consider a word w’s
projection onto GloVe’s objective III.1:
JGloVe [u] =
∑
v∈D
g (Cu,v)
(
~wTu~cv + bu + b
′
v − log Cu,v
)2
This expression is determined entirely by u’s row in MBIAS.
If two words have the same distributional vector, their ex-
pressions in the optimization objective will be completely
symmetrical, resulting in very close embeddings—even if their
cooccurrence count is 0. Second, the view of the embeddings
as matrix factorization implies an approximate linear transfor-
mation between the distributional and embedding spaces. Let
C
def
=
[
~cu1 . . .~cu|D|
]T
be the matrix whose rows are context
vectors of words ui ∈ D. Assuming M is perfectly recovered
by the products of word and context vectors, C · ~wu = ~Mu.
Dot products have very different scale in the distributional
and embedding spaces. Therefore, we use cosine similarities,
which are always between -1 and 1, and set
ŝim2 (u, v)
def
= cos
(
~Mu, ~Mv
)
(IV.2)
As long as M entries are nonnegative, the value of this
expression is always between 0 and 1.
Combining first- and second-order proximity. Our expres-
sions for first- and second-order proximities have different
scales: ŜIM1 (u, v) corresponds to an unbounded dot product,
while ŝim2 (u, v) is at most 1. To combine them, we normalize
ŜIM1 (u, v). Let fu,v (c, )
def
= max {log (c)−Bu −Bv, },
then ŜIM1 (u, v) = Mu,v = fu,v (Cu,v, 0). We set
Nu,v
def
=
√
fu,v
(∑
r∈D Cu,r, e−60
)√
fu,v
(∑
r∈D Cv,r, e−60
)
as the normalization term. This is similar to the normalization
term of cosine similarity and ensures that the value is between
0 and 1. The max operation is taken with a small e−60,
rather than 0, to avoid division by 0 in edge cases. We set
ŝim1 (u, v)
def
= fu,v (Cu,v, 0) /Nu,v . Our combined distribu-
tional expression for the embedding proximity is
ŝim1+2 (u, v)
def
= ŝim1 (u, v) /2 + ŝim2 (u, v) /2 (IV.3)
Since ŝim1 (u, v) and ŝim2 (u, v) are always between 0 and 1,
the value of this expression, too, is between 0 and 1.
Correlation tests. We trained a GloVe-paper and a SGNS
model on full Wikipedia, as described in Section VIII. We
randomly sampled (without replacement) 500 “source” words
and 500 “target” words from the 50,000 most common words
in the dictionary and computed the distributional expressions
ŝim1 (u, v), ŝim2 (u, v), and ŝim1+2 (u, v), for all 250,000
source-target word pairs using M ∈ {SPPMI,BIAS,LCO}
where LCO is defined by LCO (u, v) def= max {log (Cu,v) , 0}.
We then computed the correlations between distributional
proximities and (1) embedding proximities, and (2) word-
context proximities cos (~wu,~cv) and word-word proximities
cos (~wu, ~wv), using GloVe’s word and context vectors. These
correspond, respectively, to first- and second-order proximities
encoded in the embeddings.
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M ŝim1 (u, v) ŝim2 (u, v) ŝim1+2 (u, v)
GloVe BIAS 0.47 0.53 0.56
SPPMI 0.31 0.35 0.36
LCO 0.36 0.43 0.50
SGNS BIAS 0.31 0.29 0.32
SPPMI 0.21 0.47 0.36
LCO 0.21 0.31 0.34
Table II: Correlation of distributional proximity expressions, computed using
different distributional matrices, with the embedding proximities cos (~eu, ~ev).
expression ŝim1 (u, v) ŝim2 (u, v) ŝim1+2 (u, v)
cos (~wu, ~cv) 0.50 0.49 0.54
cos (~wu, ~wv) 0.40 0.51 0.52
cos (~eu, ~ev) 0.47 0.53 0.56
Table III: Correlation of distributional proximity expressions with cosine
similarities in GloVe’s low-dimensional representations {~wu} (word vec-
tors), {~cu} (context vectors), and {~eu} (embedding vectors), measured over
250,000 word pairs.
Tables II and III show the results. Observe that (1) in
GloVe, ŝim1+2 (u, v) consistently correlates better with the
embedding proximities than either the first- or second-order
expressions alone. (2) In SGNS, by far the strongest corre-
lation is with ŝim2 computed using SPPMI. (3) The highest
correlations are attained using the matrices factorized by the
respective embeddings. (4) The values on Table II’s diagonal
are markedly high, indicating that SIM1 correlates highly with
ŝim1, SIM2 with ŝim2, and their combination with ŝim1+2.
(5) First-order expressions correlate worse than second-order
and combined ones, indicating the importance of second-order
proximity for semantic proximity. This is especially true for
SGNS, which does not sum the word and context vectors.
V. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
Attacker capabilities. Let s ∈ D be a “source word” whose
meaning the attacker wants to change. The attacker is targeting
a victim who will train his embedding on a specific public
corpus, which may or may not be known to the attacker in
its entirety. The victim’s choice of the corpus is mandated
by the nature of the task and limited to a few big public
corpora believed to be sufficiently rich to represent natural
language (English, in our case). For example, Wikipedia is a
good choice for word-to-word translation models because it
preserves cross-language cooccurrence statistics [18], whereas
Twitter is best for named-entity recognition in tweets [17]. The
embedding algorithm and its hyperparameters are typically
public and thus known to the attacker, but we also show in
Section VIII that the attack remains effective if the attacker
uses a small subsample of the target corpus as a surrogate and
very different embedding hyperparameters.
The attacker need not know the details of downstream
models. The attacks in Sections IX–XI make only general as-
sumptions about their targets, and we show that a single attack
on the embedding can fool multiple downstream models.
We assume that the attacker can add a collection ∆ of
short word sequences, up to 11 words each, to the corpus. In
Section VIII, we explain how we simulate sequence insertion.
In Appendix G, we also consider an attacker who can edit
existing sequences, which may be viable for publicly editable
corpora such as Wikipedia.
We define the size of the attacker’s modifications |∆| as
the bigger of (a) the maximum number of appearances of a
single word, i.e., the L∞ norm of the change in the corpus’s
word-count vector, and (b) the number of added sequences.
Thus, L∞ of the word-count change is capped by |∆|, while
L1 is capped by 11 |∆|.
Overview of the attack. The attacker wants to use his corpus
modifications ∆ to achieve a certain objective for s in the
embedding space while minimizing |∆|.
0. Find distributional expression for embedding distances.
The preliminary step, done once and used for multiple attacks,
is to (0) find distributional expressions for the embedding prox-
imities. Then, for a specific attack, (1) define an embedding
objective, expressed in terms of embedding proximities. Then,
(2) derive the corresponding distributional objective, i.e., an
expression that links the embedding objective with corpus
features, with the property that if the distributional objective
holds, then the embedding objective is likely to hold. Because
a distributional objective is defined over C, the attacker can
express it as an optimization problem over cooccurrence
counts, and (3) solve it to obtain the cooccurrence change
vector. The attacker can then (4) transform the cooccurrence
change vector to a change set of corpus edits and apply
them. Finally, (5) the embedding is trained on the modified
corpus, resulting in the attacker’s changes propagating to the
embedding. Figure V.1 depicts this process.
As explained in Section IV, the goal is to find a distribu-
tional expression ŝim (u, v) that, if upheld in the corpus, will
cause a corresponding change in the embedding distances.
First, the attacker needs to know the corpus cooccurrence
counts C and the appropriate first-order proximity matrix
M (see Section IV-B). Both depend on the corpus and the
embedding algorithm and its hyperparameters, but can also be
computed from available proxies (see Section VIII).
Using C and M , set ŝim as ŝim1+2, ŝim1 or ŝim2 (see
Section IV-B). We found that the best choice depends on the
embedding (see Section VIII). For example, for GloVe, which
puts similar weight on first- and second-order proximity (see
Section III.4), ŝim1+2 is the most effective; for SGNS, which
only uses word vectors, ŝim2 is slightly more effective.
1. Derive an embedding objective. We consider two types of
adversarial objectives. An attacker with a proximity objective
wants to push s away from some words (we call them “nega-
tive”) and closer to other words (“positive”) in the embedding
space. An attacker with a rank objective wants to make s the
rth closest embedding neighbor of some word t.
To formally define these objectives, first, given two sets of
words NEG,POS ∈ P (D), define
J (s,NEG,POS; ∆)
def
=
1
|POS|+ |NEG|
( ∑
t∈POS
sim∆ (s, t)−
∑
t∈NEG
sim∆ (s, t)
)
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Figure V.1: Overview of our attack methodology.
where sim∆ (u, v) = cos (~eu, ~ev) is the cosine similarity func-
tion that measures pairwise word proximity (see Section III)
when the embeddings are computed on the modified corpus
C + ∆. J (s,NEG,POS; ∆) penalizes s’s proximity to the
words in NEG and rewards proximity to the words in POS.
Given POS, NEG, and a threshold max∆, define the
proximity objective as
argmax∆,|∆|≤max∆ J (s,NEG,POS; ∆)
This objective makes a word semantically farther from or
closer to another word or cluster of words.
Given some rank r, define the rank objective as finding a
minimal ∆ such that s is one of t’s r closest neighbors in the
embedding. Let 〈t〉r be the proximity of t to its rth closest
embedding neighbor. Then the rank constraint is equivalent to
sim∆ (s, t) ≥ 〈t〉r, and the objective can be expressed as
argmin∆,sim∆(s,t)≥〈t〉r |∆|
or, equivalently,
argmin∆,J(s,∅,{t};∆)≥〈t〉r |∆|
This objective is useful, for example, for injecting results into
a search query (see Section IX).
2. From embedding objective to distributional objective. We
now transform the optimization problem J (s,NEG,POS; ∆),
expressed over changes in the corpus and embedding prox-
imities, to a distributional objective Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
,
expressed over changes in the cooccurrence counts and distri-
butional proximities. The change vector ∆̂ denotes the change
in s’s cooccurrence vector that corresponds to adding ∆ to the
corpus. This transformation involves several steps.
(a) Changes in corpus ↔ changes in cooccurrence counts:
We use a placement strategy that takes a vector ∆̂, interprets
it as additions to s’s cooccurrence vector, and outputs ∆ such
that s’s cooccurrences in the new corpus C+ ∆ are ~Cs + ∆̂.
Other rows in C remain almost unchanged. Our objective can
now be expressed over ∆̂ as a surrogate for ∆. It still uses the
size of the corpus change, |∆|, which is easily computable
from ∆̂ without computing ∆ as explained below.
(b) Embedding proximity ↔ distributional proximity: We as-
sume that embedding proximities are monotonously increasing
(respectively, decreasing) with distributional proximities. Fig-
ure A.2–c in Appendix E shows this relationship.
(c) Embedding threshold ↔ distributional threshold: For the
rank objective, we want to increase the embedding proximity
past a threshold 〈t〉r. We heuristically determine a threshold
〈̂t〉r such that, if the distributional proximity exceeds 〈̂t〉r,
the embedding proximity exceeds 〈t〉r. Ideally, we would like
to set 〈̂t〉r as the distributional proximity from the rth-nearest
neighbor of t, but finding the rth neighbor in the distributional
space is computationally expensive. The alternative of using
words’ embedding-space ranks is not straightforward because
there exist severe abnormalities2 and embedding-space ranks
are unstable, changing from one training run to another.
Therefore, we approximate the r’th proximity by taking
the maximum of distributional proximities from words with
ranks r −m, . . . , r +m in the embedding space, for some
m. If r < m, we take the maximum over the 2m nearest
words. To increase the probability of success (at the expense
of increasing corpus modifications), we further add a small
fraction α (“safety margin”) to this maximum.
Let ŝim∆̂ (u, v) be our distributional expression for
sim (u, v), computed over the cooccurrences C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂], i.e.,
C’s cooccurrences where s’s row is updated with ∆̂. Then we
define the distributional objective as:
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
def
=
1
|POS|+ |NEG|
( ∑
t∈POS
ŝim∆̂ (s, t)−
∑
t∈NEG
ŝim∆̂ (s, t)
)
To find the cooccurrence change ∆̂ for the proximity
objective, the attack must solve:
argmax∆̂∈Rn,|∆|≤max∆ Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
and for the rank objective:
argmin
∆̂∈Rn,Ĵ(s,∅,{t};∆̂)≥〈̂t〉r+α |∆|
2For example, words with very few instances in the corpus sometimes
appear as close embedding neighbors of words with which they have only
very loose semantic affiliation and are very far from distributionally.
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3. From distributional objective to cooccurence changes. The
previous steps produce a distributional objective consisting of
a source word s, a positive target word set POS, a negative
target word set NEG, and the constraints: either a maximal
change set size max∆, or a minimal proximity threshold 〈̂t〉r.
We solve this objective with an optimization procedure
(described in Section VI) that outputs a change vector with the
smallest |∆| that maximizes the sum of proximities between
s and POS minus the sum of proximities with NEG, subject
to the constraints. It starts with ∆̂ = (0, . . . 0) and iteratively
increases the entries in ∆̂. In each iteration, it increases the
entry that maximizes the increase in Ĵ (. . .), divided by the
increase in |∆|, until the appropriate threshold (max∆ or
〈̂t〉r + α) has been crossed.
This computation involves the size of the corpus change,
|∆|. In our placement strategy, |∆| is tightly bounded by a
known linear combination of ∆̂’s elements and can therefore
be efficiently computed from ∆̂.
4. From cooccurrence changes to corpus changes. From
the cooccurrence change vector ∆̂, the attacker computes the
corpus change ∆ using the placement strategy which ensures
that, in the modified corpus C + ∆, the cooccurrence matrix
is close to C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂]. Because the distributional objective
holds under these cooccurrence counts, it holds in C+ ∆.
|∆| should be as small as possible. In Section VII, we
show that our placement strategy achieves solutions that are
extremely close to optimal in terms of |∆|, and that |∆| is a
known linear combination of ∆̂ elements (as required above).
5. Embeddings are trained. The embeddings are trained on
the modified corpus. If the attack has been successful, the
attacker’s objectives are true in the new embedding.
Recap of the attack parameters. The attacker must first
find M and ŝim that are appropriate for the targeted embed-
ding. This can be done once. The proximity attacker must
then choose the source word s, the positive and negative
target-word sets POS,NEG, and the maximum size of the
corpus changes max∆. The rank attacker must choose the
source word s, the target word t, the desired rank r, and a
“safety margin” α for the transformation from embedding-
space thresholds to distributional-space thresholds.
VI. OPTIMIZATION IN COOCCURRENCE-VECTOR SPACE
This section describes the optimization procedure in step
3 of our attack methodology (Figure V.1). It produces a
cooccurrence change vector that optimizes the distributional
objective from Section V, subject to constraints.
Gradient-based approaches are inadequate. Gradient-based
approaches such as SGD result in a poor trade-off between
|∆| and Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
. First, with our distributional
expressions, most entries in ~Ms remain 0 in the vicinity of
∆̂ = 0 due to the max operation in the computation of
M (see Section IV-B). Consequently, their gradients are 0.
Even if we initialize ∆̂ so that its entries start from a value
where the gradient is non-zero, the optimization will quickly
push most entries to 0 to fulfill the constraint |∆| ≤ max∆,
and the gradients of these entries will be rendered useless.
Second, gradient-based approaches may increase vector entries
by arbitrarily small values, whereas cooccurrences are drawn
from a discrete space because they are linear combinations of
cooccurrence event weights (see Section III). For example,
if the window size is 5 and the weight is determined by
γ = 1− d5 , then the possible weights are
{
1
5 , . . .
5
5
}
.
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
exhibits diminishing returns: usually,
the bigger the increase in ∆̂ entries, the smaller the marginal
gain from increasing them further. Such objectives can often
be cast as submodular maximization [36, 53] problems, which
typically lend themselves well to greedy algorithms. We in-
vestigate this further in Appendix B.
Our approach. We define a discrete set of step sizes L and
gradually increase entries in ∆̂ in increments chosen from L so
as to maximize the objective Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
. We stop
when |∆| > max∆ or Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
≥ 〈̂t〉r + α.
L should be fine-grained so the steps are optimal and entries
in ∆̂ map tightly onto cooccurrence events in the corpus, yet
L should have a sufficient range to “peek beyond” the max-
threshold where the entry starts getting non-zero values. A
natural L is a subset of the space of linear combinations of
possible weights, with an exact mapping between it and a
series of cooccurrence events. This mapping, however, cannot
be directly computed by the placement strategy (Section VII),
which produces an approximation. For better performance, we
chose a slightly more coarse-grained L← { 15 , . . . 305 }.
Our algorithm can accommodate L with negative values,
which correspond to removing cooccurrence events from the
corpus—see Appendix G.
Our optimization algorithm. Let X̂∆̂ be some expression that
depends on ∆̂, and define di,δ
[
X̂
]
def
= X̂∆̂′ − X̂∆̂, where ∆̂
is the change vector after setting ∆̂i ← ∆̂i + δ. We initialize
∆̂← 0, and in every step choose
i∗, δ∗ = argmaxi∈[|D|],δ∈L
di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
di,δ [|∆|]
(VI.1)
and set ∆̂i∗ ← ∆̂i∗+ δ∗. If Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
≥ 〈̂t〉r +α
or |∆| ≥ max∆, then quit and return ∆̂.
Directly computing Equation VI.1 for all i, δ is expensive.
The denominator di,δ [|∆|] is easy to compute efficiently
because it’s a linear combination of ∆̂ elements (see Sec-
tion VII). The numerator di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
, how-
ever, requires O(|L| |D|2) computations per step (assuming
|NEG| + |POS| = O (1); in our settings it is ≤ 10). Since
|D| is very big (up to millions of words), this is intractable.
Instead of computing each step directly, we developed an
algorithm that maintains intermediate values in memory. This
is similar to backpropagation, except that we consider variable
changes in L rather than infinitesimally small differentials.
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This approach can compute the numerator in O (1) and,
crucially, is entirely parallelizable across all i, δ, enabling the
computation in every optimization step to be offloaded onto
a GPU. In practice, this algorithm finds ∆ in minutes (see
Section VIII). Full details can be found in Appendix B.
VII. PLACEMENT INTO CORPUS
The placement strategy is step 4 of our methodology (see
Fig. V.1). It takes a cooccurrence change vector ∆̂ and creates
a minimal change set ∆ to the corpus such that (a) |∆| is
bounded by a linear combination ~ω, i.e., |∆| ≤ ~ω · ∆̂, and (b)
the optimal value of Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
is preserved.
Our placement strategy first divides ∆̂ into (1) entries of
the form ∆̂t, t ∈ POS—these changes to ~Cs increase the
first-order similarity ŝim1 between s and t, and (2) the rest
of the entries, which increase the objective in other ways. The
strategy adds different types of sequences to ∆ to fulfil these
two goals. For the first type, it adds multiple, identical first-
order sequences, containing just the source and target words.
For the second type, it adds second-order sequences, each
containing the source word and 10 other words, constructed as
follows. It starts with a collection of sequences containing just
s, then iterates over every non-zero entry in ∆̂ corresponding
to the second-order changes u ∈ D \ POS, and chooses a
collection of sequences into which to insert u so that the added
cooccurrences of u with s become approximately equal to ∆̂u.
This strategy upholds properties (a) and (b) above, achieves
(in practice) close to optimal |∆|, and runs in under a minute
in our setup (Section VIII). See Appendix D for details.
VIII. BENCHMARKS
Datasets. We use a full Wikipedia text dump, downloaded
on January 20, 2018. For the Sub-Wikipedia experiments, we
randomly chose 10% of the articles.
Embedding algorithms and hyperparameters. We use Pen-
nington et al.’s original implementation of GloVe [56], with
two settings for the (hyper)parameters: (1) paper, with
parameter values from [56]—this is our default, and (2)
tutorial, with parameters values from [77]. Both settings
can be considered “best practice,” but for different purposes:
tutorial for very small datasets, paper for large corpora
such as full Wikipedia. Table IV summarizes the differences,
which include the maximum size of the vocabulary (if the
actual vocabulary is bigger, the least frequent words are
dropped), minimal word count (words with fewer occurrences
are ignored), cmax (see Section III), embedding dimension,
window size, and number of epochs. The other parameters are
set to their defaults. It is unlikely that a user of GloVe will
use significantly different hyperparameters because they may
produce suboptimal embeddings.
We use Gensim Word2Vec’s implementations of SGNS and
CBHS with the default parameters, except that we set the
number of epochs to 15 instead of 5 (more epochs result in
more consistent embeddings across training runs, though the
effect may be small [32]) and limited the vocabulary to 400k.
scheme name
max vocab
size
min word
count cmax
embedding
dimension
window
size epochs
negative
sampling size
GloVe-paper 400k 0 100 100 10 50 N/A
GloVe-paper-300 400k 0 100 300 10 50 N/A
GloVe-tutorial ∞ 5 10 50 15 15 N/A
SGNS 400k 0 N/A 100 5 15 5
CBHS 400k 0 N/A 100 5 15 N/A
Table IV: Hyperparameter settings.
Inserting the attacker’s sequences into the corpus. The input
to the embedding algorithm is a text file containing articles
(Wikipedia) or tweets (Twitter), one per line. We add each
of the attacker’s sequences in a separate line, then shuffle
all lines. For Word2Vec embeddings, which depend somewhat
on the order of lines, we found the attack to be much more
effective if the attacker’s sequences are at the end of the file,
but we do not exploit this observation in our experiments.
Implementation. We implemented the attack in Python and
ran it on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9980XE CPU @ 3.00GHz,
using the CuPy [19] library to offload parallelizable optimiza-
tion (see Section VI) to an RTX 2080 Ti GPU. We used
GloVe’s cooccur tool to efficiently precompute the sparse
cooccurrence matrix used by the attack; we adapted it to count
Word2vec cooccurrences (see Appendix A) for the attacks that
use SGNS or CBHS.
For the attack using GloVe-paper with M = BIAS, ŝim =
ŝim1+2,max∆ = 1250, the optimization procedure from
Section VI found ∆̂ in 3.5 minutes on average. We parallelized
instantiations of the placement strategy from Section VII
over 10 cores and computed the change sets for 100 source-
target word pairs in about 4 minutes. Other settings were
similar, with the running times increasing proportionally to
max∆. Computing corpus cooccurrences and pre-training the
embedding (done once and used for multiple attacks) took
about 4 hours on 12 cores.
Attack parameterization. To evaluate the attack under dif-
ferent hyperparameters, we use a proximity attacker (see
Section V) on a randomly chosen set Ωbenchmark of 100 word
pairs, each from the 100k most common words in the corpus.
For each pair (s, t) ∈ Ωbenchmark, we perform our attack
with NEG = ∅, POS = t and different values of max∆ and
hyperparameters.
We also experiment with different distributional expres-
sions: ŝim ∈
{
ŝim1, ŝim2, ŝim1+2
}
, M ∈ {BIAS,SPPMI}.
(The choice of M is irrelevant for pure-ŝim1 attackers—see
Section VII). When attacking SGNS with M = BIAS, and
when attacking GloVe-paper-300, we used GloVe-paper to
precompute the bias terms.
Finally, we consider an attacker who does not know the
victim’s full corpus, embedding algorithm, or hyperparame-
ters. First, we assume that the victim trains an embedding
on Wikipedia, while the attacker only has the Sub-Wikipedia
sample. We experiment with an attacker who uses GloVe-
tutorial parameters to attack a GloVe-paper victim, as
well as an attacker who uses a SGNS embedding to attack
a GloVe-paper victim, and vice versa. These attackers use
max∆/10 when computing ∆̂ on the smaller corpus (step 3
in Figure V.1), then set ∆̂ ← 10∆̂ before computing ∆ (in
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step 4), resulting in |∆| ≤ max∆. We also simulated the
scenario where the victim trains an embedding on a union of
Wikipedia and Common Crawl [30], whereas the attacker only
uses Wikipedia. For this experiment, we used similarly sized
random subsamples of Wikipedia and Common Crawl, for a
total size of about 1/5th of full Wikipedia, and proportionally
reduced the bound on the attacker’s change set size.
In all experiments, we perform the attack on all 100 word
pairs, add the computed sequences to the corpus, and train
an embedding using the victim’s setting. In this embedding,
we measure the median rank of the source word in the target
word’s list of neighbors, the average increase in the source-
target cosine similarity in the embedding space, and how many
source words are among their targets’ top 10 neighbors.
Attacks are universally successful. Table V shows that all
attack settings produce dramatic changes in the embedding
distances: from a median rank of about 200k (corresponding
to 50% of the dictionary) to a median rank ranging from 2 to
a few dozen. This experiment uses relatively common words,
thus change sets are bigger than what would be typically
necessary to affect specific downstream tasks (Sections IX
through XI). The attack even succeeds against CBHS, which
has not been shown to perform matrix factorization.
Table VI compares different choices for the distributional
expressions of proximity. ŝim2 performs best for GloVe, ŝim2
for SGNS. For SGNS, ŝim1 is far less effective than the other
options. Surprisingly, an attacker who uses the BIAS matrix
is effective against SGNS and not just GloVe.
Attacks transfer. Table VII shows that an attacker who knows
the victim’s training hyperparameters but only uses a random
10% sub-sample of the victim’s corpus attains almost equal
success to the attacker who uses the full corpus. In fact, the
attacker might even prefer to use the sub-sample because the
attack is about 10x faster as it precomputes the embedding
on a smaller corpus and finds a smaller change vector. If
the attacker’s hyperparameters are different from the victim’s,
there is a very minor drop in the attacks’ efficacy. These
observations hold for both ŝim2 and ŝim1+2 attackers. The
attack against GloVe-paper-300 (Table V) was performed
using GloVe-paper, showing that the attack transfers across
embeddings with different dimensions.
The attack also transfers across different embedding al-
gorithms. The attack sequences computed against a SGNS
embedding on a small subset of the corpus dramatically affect
a GloVe embedding trained on the full corpus, and vice versa.
IX. ATTACKING RESUME SEARCH
Recruiters and companies looking for candidates with spe-
cific skills often use automated, index-based document search
engines that assign a score to each resume and retrieve the
highest-scoring ones. Scoring methods vary but, typically,
when a word from the query matches a word in a document,
the document’s score increases proportionally to the word’s
rarity in the document collection. For example, in the popular
Lucene’s Practical Scoring function [24], a document’s score
setting max∆
median
rank
avg. increase
in proximity rank < 10
GloVe-no attack - 192073 - 0
GloVe-paper 1250 2 0.64 72
GloVe-paper-300 1250 1 0.60 87
SGNS-no attack - 182550 - 0
SGNS 1250 37 0.50 35
SGNS 2500 10 0.56 49
CBHS-no attack - 219691 - 0
CBHS 1250 204 0.45 25
CBHS 2500 26 0.55 35
Table V: Results for 100 word pairs, attacking different embedding algorithms
with M = BIAS, and using ŝim2 (for SGNS/CBHS) or ŝim1+2 (for GloVe).
setting ŝim M
median
rank
avg. increase
in proximity rank < 10
GloVe-paper ŝim1 * 3 0.54 61
GloVe-paper ŝim2 BIAS 4 0.58 63
GloVe-paper ŝim1+2 BIAS 2 0.64 72
SGNS ŝim1 * 1079 0.34 7
SGNS ŝim2 BIAS 37 0.50 35
SGNS ŝim1+2 BIAS 69 0.48 30
SGNS ŝim2 SPPMI 226 0.44 15
SGNS ŝim1+2 SPPMI 264 0.44 17
Table VI: Results for 100 word pairs, using different distributional expressions
and max∆ = 1250.
is produced by multiplying3 (1) a function of the percentage
of the query words in the document by (2) the sum of TF-IDF
scores (a metric that rewards rare words) of every query word
that appears in the document.
To help capture the semantics of the query rather than its bag
of words, queries are typically expanded [23, 71] to include
synonyms and semantically close words. Query expansion
based on pre-trained word embeddings expands each query
word to its neighbors in the embedding space [21, 39, 61].
Consider an attacker who sends a resume to recruiters that
rely on a resume search engine with embedding-based query
expansion. The attacker wants his resume to be returned in
response to queries containing specific technical terms, e.g.,
“iOS”. The attacker cannot make big changes to his resume,
such as adding the word “iOS” dozens of the times, but he
can inconspicuously add a meaningless, made-up character
sequence, e.g., as a Twitter or Skype handle.
We show how this attacker can poison the embeddings so
that an arbitrary rare word appearing in his resume becomes an
embedding neighbor of—and thus semantically synonymous
to—a query word (e.g., “cyber”, “iOS”, or “devops”, if the
target is technical recruiting). As a consequence, his resume
is likely to rank high among the results for these queries.
Experimental setup. We experiment with a victim who trains
GloVe-paper or SGNS embeddings (see Section VIII) on the
full Wikipedia. The attacker uses M = BIAS and ŝim1+2 for
GloVe and ŝim2 for SGNS, respectively.
We collected a dataset of resumes and job descriptions
distributed on a mailing list of thousands of cybersecurity
3This function includes other terms not material to this exposition.
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parameters/Wiki corpus size ŝim
median
rank
avg. increase
in proximity rank < 10
attacker victim
GloVe-tutorial/subsample GloVe-paper/full ŝim2 9 0.53 52
GloVe-tutorial/subsample GloVe-paper/full ŝim1+2 2 0.63 75
GloVe-paper/subsample GloVe-paper/full ŝim2 7 0.55 57
GloVe-paper/subsample GloVe-paper/full ŝim1+2 2 0.64 79
SGNS/subsample GloVe-paper/full ŝim2 110 0.38 11
GloVe-paper/subsample SGNS/full ŝim2 152 0.44 19
GloVe-paper/subsample
GloVe-paper/
Wiki+Common Crawl ŝim2 2 0.59 68
Table VII: Transferability of the attack (100 word pairs). max∆ = 1250
for attacking the full Wikipedia, max∆ = 1250/5 for attacking the
Wiki+Common Crawl subsample.
professionals. As our query collection, we use job titles
that contain the words “junior,” “senior,” or “lead” and can
thus act as concise, query-like job descriptions. This yields
approximately 2000 resumes and 700 queries.
For the retrieval engine, we use Elasticsearch [25], based
on Apache Lucene. We use the index() method to index
documents. When querying for a string q, we use simple
match queries but expand q with the top K embedding
neighbors of every word in q.
The attack. As our targets, we picked 20 words that appear
most frequently in the queries and are neither stop words,
nor generic words with more than 30,000 occurrences in the
Wikipedia corpus (e.g., “developer” or “software” are unlikely
to be of interest to an attacker). Out of these 20 words, 2
were not originally in the embedding and thus removed from
Ωsearch. The remaining words are VP, fwd, SW, QA, analyst,
dev, stack, startup, Python, frontend, labs, DDL, analytics,
automation, cyber, devops, backend, iOS.
For each of the 18 target words t ∈ Ωsearch, we randomly
chose 20 resumes with this word, appended a different random
made-up string sz to each resume z, and added the resulting
resume z ∩ {sz} to the indexed resume dataset (which also
contains the original resume). Each z simulates a separate
attack. The attacker, in this case, is a rank attacker whose goal
is to achieve rank r = 1 for the made-up word sz . Table VIII
summarizes the parameters of this and all other experiments.
Results. Following our methodology, we found distributional
objectives, cooccurrence change vectors, and the correspond-
ing corpus change sets for every source-target pair, then re-
trained the embeddings on the modified corpus. We measured
(1) how many changes it takes to get into the top 1, 3, and 5
neighbors of the target word (Table IX), and (2) the effect of
a successful injection on the attacker’s resume’s rank among
the documents retrieved in response to the queries of interest
and queries consisting just of the target word (Table X).
For GloVe, only a few hundred sequences added to the
corpus result in over half of the attacker’s words becoming the
top neighbors of their targets. With 700 sequences, the attacker
can almost always make his word the top neighbor. For SGNS,
too, several hundred sequences achieve high success rates.
Successful injection of a made-up word into the embedding
reduces the average rank of the attacker’s resume in the query
results by about an order of magnitude, and the median rank
is typically under 10 (vs. 100s before the attack). If the results
are arranged into pages of 10, as is often the case in practice,
the attacker’s resume will appear on the first page. If K = 1,
the attacker’s resume is almost always the first result.
In Appendix F, we show that our attack outperforms a
“brute-force” attacker who rewrites his resume to include
actual words from the expanded queries.
X. ATTACKING NAMED-ENTITY RECOGNITION
A named entity recognition (NER) solver identifies named
entities in a word sequence and classifies their type. For
example, NER for tweets [45, 47, 59] can detect events or
trends [44, 60]. In NER, pre-trained word embeddings are
particularly useful for classifying emerging entities that were
not seen while training but are often important to detect [17].
We consider two (opposite) adversarial goals: (1) “hide” a
corporation name so that it’s not classified properly by NER,
and (2) increase the number of times a corporation name is
classified as such by NER. NER solvers rely on spatial clusters
in the embeddings that correspond to entity types. Names
that are close to corporation names seen during training are
likely to be classified as corporations. Thus, to make a name
less “visible,” one should push it away from its neighboring
corporations and closer to the words that the NER solver is
expected to recognize as another entity type (e.g., location). To
increase the likelihood of a name classified as a corporation,
one should push it towards the corporations cluster.
Experimental setup. We downloaded the Spritzer Twitter
stream archive for October 2018 [6], randomly sampled around
45M English tweets, and processed them into a GloVe-
compatible input file using existing tools [74]. The victim
trains a GloVe-paper embedding (see Section VIII) on this
dataset. The attacker uses ŝim = ŝim1+2 and M = BIAS.
To train NER solvers, we used the WNUT 2017 dataset
provided with the Flair NLP python library [2] and expressly
designed to measure NER performance on emerging entities.
It comprises tweets and other social media posts tagged with
six types of named entities: corporations, creative work (e.g.,
song names), groups, locations, persons, and products. The
dataset is split into the train, validation, and test subsets. We
extracted a set Ωcorp of about 65 corporation entities such that
(1) their name consists of one word, and (2) does not appear
in the training set as a corporation name.
We used Flair’s tutorial [78] to train our NER solvers. The
features of our AllFeatures solver are a word embedding,
characters of the word (with their own embedding), and
Flair’s contextual embedding [2]. Trained with a clean word
embedding, this solver reached an F-1 score of 42 on the test
set, somewhat lower than the state of the art reported in [79].
We also trained a JustEmbeddings solver that uses only a word
embedding and attains an F-1 score of 32.
Hiding a corporation name. We applied our proximity
attacker to make the embeddings of a word in Ωcorp
closer to a group of location names. For every s ∈ Ωcorp,
we set POS to the five single-word location names
that appear most frequently in the training dataset,
and NEG to the five corporation names that appear
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section / attack
attacker
type embedding corpus M ŝim source word s target words t or POS,NEG Threshold max∆ rank r, safety margin α
Section VIII
benchmarks proximity
GloVe,SGNS,
CBHS
Wikipedia (victim),
Wikipedia sample (attacker)
BIAS,
SPPMI
ŝim1, ŝim2,
ŝim1+2
100 randomly chosen source-target pairs in Ωbenchmark 1250, 2500 -
Section IX
make a made-up word come up
high in search queries
rank GloVe, SGNS Wikipedia BIAS ŝim2, ŝim1+2
made-up s for every
t ∈ Ωsearch t ∈ Ωsearch - r = 1, α ∈ {0.2, 0.3}
Section X
hide corporation names proximity GloVe Twitter BIAS ŝim1+2 s ∈ Ωcorp
POS: 5 most common locations
in training set
NEG: 5 corporations closest
to s (in embedding space)
min
{
#s
40 , 2500
}
,
min
{
#s
4 , 2500
}
,
2 min {#s/4, 2500}
-
Section X
make corporation names
more visible
proximity GloVe Twitter BIAS ŝim1+2
made-up word
s =evilcorporation
POS: 5 most common corporations
in the training set; NEG = ∅ max∆ ∈ {2500, 250} -
Section XI
make a made-up word translate
to a specific word
rank GloVe Wikipedia BIAS ŝim1+2
made-up s for every
t ∈ Ωtrans t ∈ Ωtrans - r = 1, α = 0.1
Section XII
evade perplexity defense rank SGNS Twitter subsample BIAS ŝim2
20 made-up words for
every t ∈ Ωrank t ∈ Ωrank - r = 1, α = 0.2
Appendix G
evaluate an attacker who
can delete from the corpus
proximity GloVe Wikipedia BIAS ŝim2 (s, t) ∈ {(war, peace), (freedom, slavery), (ignorance, strength)} 1000 -
Table VIII: Parameters of the experiments.
victim α K = 1 K = 3 K = 5
%success avg |∆| %success avg |∆| %success avg |∆|
GloVe 0.1 61.1% 211 94.4% 341 94.4% 341
GloVe 0.2 94.4% 661 100.0% 649 100.0% 649
SGNS 0.2 38.9% 215 55.6% 278 61.1% 287
Table IX: Percentage of t ∈ Ωsearch for which the made-up word reached
within K neighbors of the target; the average size of the corpus change set
for these cases.
query type K = 1 K = 3 K = 5
target word only 88 → 1 103 → 5 107 → 10
entire query 103 → 6 108 → 10 111 → 14
Table X: Median rank of the attacker’s resume in the result set, before (left)
and after (right) the attack.
in the training dataset and are closest to s in the
embedding. We evaluated the attack for max∆ ∈
{min {#s/40, 2500} ,min {#s/4, 2500} , 2 min {#s/4, 2500}}
where #s is the number of s’s occurrences in the original
corpus. Table VIII summarizes these parameters.
Following our methodology, we found the distributional ob-
jectives, cooccurrence change vectors, and the corresponding
corpus change sets for every s, added the change sets to
the corpus, and retrained the embeddings and NER solvers.
For the last attacker (max∆ = 2 min {#s/4, 2500}), we
approximated ∆̂ by multiplying the change vector of size
min {#s/4, 2500} by 2.
Making a corporation name more visible. Consider an
emerging corporation name that initially does not have an
embedding at all. The attack aims to make it more visible
to NER solvers. We set s to evilcorporation (which
does not appear in our Twitter corpus); POS to the five single-
word location names appearing most frequently in the training
set, and NEG to ∅. We evaluated the attack for max∆ ∈
{250, 2500}. Table VIII summarizes these parameters.
We trained three solvers: with a “clean,” no-attack em-
bedding and with the two embeddings resulting from our
attack with max∆ set to, respectively, 250 and 2500. For
the evaluation, we could not use the word itself because the
AllFeatures solver uses the word’s characters as a feature.
We want to isolate the specific effect of changes in the word
embedding, without affecting characters and other features. To
this end, we directly replaced the embeddings of corporation
names with that of evilcorporation. For the clean solver,
the word does not exist in its dictionary, so we changed the
embeddings of corporation names to those of unknown words.
Results. Table XIa shows the results for hiding a corporation
name, and Table XIb for making a name more visible. Even
a small change (under 250 sequences) has some effect, and
larger change sets make the attack very effective. Even the
larger sets are not very big and do not produce high spikes
in the frequency of the source word. For perspective, 250
appearances would make a word rank around the 50,000th
most frequent in our corpus, similar to ‘feira’ and ‘frnds’;
2,500 appearances would make it around the 10,000th most
frequent, similar to ‘incase’ or ‘point0’.
The effect on the solver’s test accuracy is insignificant.
We observed minor fluctuations in the F-1 score (<0.01 for
the AllFeatures solver, <0.03 for JustEmbeddings, including
increases from the score of the clean embedding, which we
attribute to the stochasticity of the training process.
XI. ATTACKING WORD-TO-WORD TRANSLATION
Using word embeddings to construct a translation dictio-
nary, i.e., a word-to-word mapping between two languages,
assumes that correspondences between words in the embed-
ding space hold for any language [51], thus a translated word
is expected to preserve its relations with other words. For
example, the embedding of “gato” in Spanish should have
similar relations with the embeddings of “pez” and “comer”
as “cat” has with “fish” and “eat” in English.
The algorithms that create embeddings do not enforce
specific locations for any word. Constructing a translation
dictionary thus requires learning an alignment between the two
embedding spaces. A simple linear operation is sufficient for
this [51]. Enforcing the alignment matrix to be orthogonal also
preserves the inter-relations of embeddings in the space [75].
To learn the parameters of the alignment, one can either use
an available, limited-size dictionary [9, 66], or rely solely on
the structure of the space and learn it in an unsupervised fash-
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NER solver no attack max∆ =
min
{
#s
40
, 2500
} max∆ =
min
{
#s
4
, 2500
} max∆ =
2 min
{
#s
4
, 2500
}
AllFeatures 12 (4) 12 (4) 10 (10) 6 (19)
JustEmbeddings 5 (4) 4 (5) 1 (8) 1 (22)
(a) Hiding corporation names. Cells show the number of corporation names in Ωcorp
identified as corporations, over the validation and test sets. The numbers in parentheses
are how many were misclassified as locations.
NER solver no attack max∆ =
250
max∆ =
2500
AllFeatures 7 13 25
JustEmbeddings 0 8 18
(b) Making corporation names more visible. Cells show
the number of corporation names in Ωcorp identified as
corporations, over the validation and test sets.
Table XI: NER attack.
target language K = 1 K = 5 K = 10
Spanish 82% / 72% 92% / 84% 94% / 85%
German 76% / 51% 84% / 61% 92% / 64%
Italian 69% / 58% 82% / 73% 82% / 78%
Table XII: Word translation attack. On the left in each cell is the performance
of the translation model (presented as precision@K); on the right, the
percentage of successful attacks, out of the correctly translated word pairs.
ion [18]. Based on the learned alignment, word translations
can be computed by cross-language nearest neighbors.
Modifying a word’s position in the English embedding
space can affect its translation in other language spaces. To
make a word s translate to t′ in other languages, one can
make s close to t in English that translates to t′. This way,
the attack does not rely on the translation model or the
translated language. The better the translation model, the
higher the chance s will indeed translate to t′.
Experimental setup. Victim and attacker train a GloVe-
paper-300 English embedding on full Wikipedia. We use
pre-trained dimension-300 embeddings for Spanish, German,
and Italian.4 The attacker uses M = BIAS and ŝim = ŝim1+2.
For word translation, we use the supervised script from the
MUSE framework [18]. The alignment matrix is learned using
a set of 5k known word-pair translations; the translation of
any word is its nearest neighbor in the embedding space of
the other language. Because translation can be a one-to-many
relation, we also extract 5 and 10 nearest neighbors.
We make up a new English word and use it as the source
word s whose translation we want to control. As our targets
Ωtrans, we extracted an arbitrary set of 50 English words
from the MUSE library’s full (200k) dictionary of English
words with Spanish, German, and Italian translations. For each
English word t ∈ Ωtrans, let t′ be its translation. We apply the
rank attacker with the desired rank r = 1 and safety margin
α = 0.1. Table VIII summarizes these parameters.
Results. Table XII summarizes the results. For all three target
languages, the attack makes s translate to t′ in more than half
of the cases that were translated correctly by the model.
Performance of the Spanish translation model is the highest,
with 82% precision@1, and the attack is also most effective
on it, with 72% precision@1. The results on the German
and Italian models are slightly worse, with 61% and 73%
precision@5, respectively. The better the translation model,
the higher the absolute number of successful attacks.
4https://github.com/uchile-nlp/spanish-word-embeddings; https://deepset.ai
/german-word-embeddings; http://hlt.isti.cnr.it/wordembeddings
evasion
variant
median
rank
avg.
proximity
percent of
rank < 10
avg.
|∆|
original corpus’s
sentences filtered
none 1 → * 0.80 → 0.21 95 → 25 41 20%
λ-gram 1 → 2 0.75 → 0.63 90 → 85 81 70%
and-lenient 1 → 670 0.73 → 0.36 90 → 30 52 50%
and-strict 2 → 56 0.67 → 0.49 70 → 40 99 66%
Table XIII: Results of the attack with different strategies to evade the
perplexity-based defense. The defense filters out all sentences whose perplex-
ity is above the median and thus loses 50% of the corpus to false positives.
Attack metrics before and after the filtering are shown to the left and right of
arrows. * means that more than half of s appeared less than 5 times in the
filtered corpus and, as a result, were not included in the emdeddings (proximity
was considered 0 for those cases). The right column shows the percentage of
the corpus that the defense needs to filter out in order to remove 80% of ∆.
XII. MITIGATIONS AND EVASION
Detecting anomalies in word frequencies. Sudden appear-
ances of previously unknown words in a public corpus such
as Twitter are not anomalous per se. New words often appear
and rapidly become popular (viz. covfefe).
Unigram frequencies of the existing common words are rel-
atively stable and could be monitored, but our attack does not
cause them to spike. Second-order sequences add no more than
a few instances of every word other than s (see Section VII
and Appendix D). When s is an existing word, such as in
our NER attack (Section X), we bound the number of its
new appearances as a function of its prior frequency. When
using ŝim1+2, first-order sequences add multiple instances
of the target word, but the absolute numbers are still low,
e.g., at most 13% of its original count in our resume-search
attacks (Section IX) and at most 3% in our translation attacks
(Section XI). The average numbers are much lower. First-order
sequences might cause a spike in the corpus’ bigram frequency
of (s, t), but the attack can still succeed with only second-order
sequences (see Section VIII).
Filtering out high-perplexity sentences. A better defense
might exploit the fact that “sentences” in ∆ are ungrammatical
sequences of words. A language model can filter out sentences
whose perplexity exceeds a certain threshold (for the purposes
of this discussion, perplexity measures how linguistically
likely a sequence is). Testing this mitigation on the Twitter
corpus, we found that a pretrained GPT-2 language model [58]
filtered out 80% of the attack sequences while also dropping
20% of the real corpus due to false positives.
This defense faces two obstacles. First, language models,
too, are trained on public data and thus subject to poisoning.
Second, an attacker can evade this defense by deliberately
decreasing the perplexity of his sequences. We introduce two
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strategies to reduce the perplexity of attack sequences.
The first evasion strategy is based on Algorithm 2 (Ap-
pendix D) but uses the conjunction “and” to decrease the
perplexity of the generated sequences. In the strict variant,
“and” is inserted at odd word distances from s. In the
lenient variant, “and” is inserted at even distances, leaving
the immediate neighbor of s available to the attacker. In this
case, we relax the definition of |∆| to not count “and.” It is
so common that its frequency in the corpus will not spike no
matter how many instances the attacker adds.
The second evasion strategy is an alternative to Algorithm 2
that only uses existing n-grams from the corpus to form attack
sequences. Specifically, assuming that our window size is λ
(i.e., we generate sequences of length 2λ + 1 with s in the
middle), we constrain the subsequences before and after s to
existing λ-grams from the corpus.
To reduce the running time, we pre-collect all λ-grams from
the corpus and select them in a greedy fashion, based on the
values of the change vector ∆̂. At each step, we pick the
word with the highest and lowest values in ∆̂ and use the
highest-scoring λ-gram that starts with this word as the post-
and pre-subsequence, respectively. The score of a λ-gram is
determined by
∑λ
i=1 γ(i) · ∆̂[ui], where ui is the word in the
ith position of the λ-gram and γ is the weighting function (see
Section III). To discourage the use of words that are not in
the original ∆̂ vector, they are assigned a fixed negative value.
This sequence is added to ∆ and the values of ∆̂ are updated
accordingly. The process continues until all values of ∆̂ are
addressed or until no λ-grams start with the remaining positive
us in ∆̂. In the latter case, we form additional sequences
with the remaining us in a per-word greedy fashion, without
syntactic constraints.
Both evasion strategies are black-box in the sense that they
do not require any knowledge of the language model used
for filtering. If the language model is known, the attacker can
use it to score λ-grams or to generate connecting words that
reduce the perplexity.
Experimental setup. Because computing the perplexity of all
sentences in a corpus is expensive, we use a subsample of 2
million random sentences from the Twitter corpus. This corpus
is relatively small, thus we use SGNS embeddings which are
known to perform better on small datasets [52].
For a simulated attack, we randomly pick 20 words from
the 20k most frequent words in the corpus as Ωrank. We use
made-up words as source words. The goal of the attack is to
make a made-up word the nearest embedding neighbor of t
with a change set ∆ that survives the perplexity-based defense.
We use a rank attacker with ŝim = ŝim2, M = BIAS, rank
objective r = 1, and safety margin of α = 0.2. Table VIII
summarizes these parameters.
We simulate a very aggressive defense that drops all se-
quences whose perplexity is above median, losing half of the
corpus as a consequence. The sequences from ∆ that survive
the filtering (i.e., whose perplexity is below median) are added
to the remaining corpus and the embedding is (re-)trained to
measure if the attack has been successful.
Results. Table XIII shows the trade-off between the efficacy
and evasiveness of the attack. Success of the attack is cor-
related with the fraction of ∆ whose perplexity is below the
filtering threshold. The original attack achieves the highest
proximity and smallest |∆| but for most words the defense
successfully blocks the attack.
Conjunction-based evasion strategies enable the attack to
survive even aggressive filtering. For the and-strict variant,
this comes at the cost of reduced efficacy and an increase in
|∆|. The λ-gram strategy is almost as effective as the original
attack in the absence of the defense and is still successful in
the presence of the defense, achieving a median rank of 2.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
Word embeddings are trained on public, malleable data such
as Wikipedia and Twitter. Understanding the causal connection
between corpus-level features such as word cooccurences and
semantic proximity as encoded in the embedding-space vector
distances opens the door to poisoning attacks that change loca-
tions of words in the embedding and thus their computational
“meaning.” This problem may affect other transfer-learning
models trained on malleable data, e.g., language models.
To demonstrate feasibility of these attacks, we (1) developed
distributional expressions over corpus elements that empiri-
cally cause predictable changes in the embedding distances,
(2) devised algorithms to optimize the attacker’s utility while
minimizing modifications to the corpus, and (3) demonstrated
universality of our approach by showing how an attack on
the embeddings can change the meaning of words “beneath
the feet” of NLP task solvers for information retrieval, named
entity recognition, and translation. We also demonstrated that
these attacks do not require knowledge of the specific em-
bedding algorithm and its hyperparameters. Obvious defenses
such as detecting anomalies in word frequencies or filtering
out low-perplexity sentences are ineffective. How to protect
public corpora from poisoning attacks designed to affect NLP
models remains an interesting open problem.
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APPENDIX
A. SGNS background
To find {~cu}u∈D , {~wv}u∈D, Word2vec defines and opti-
mizes a series of local objectives using cooccurrence events
stochastically sampled from the corpus one at a time. The
probability of sampling a given event of u,w’s cooccurrence
is max {1− (d− 1) /Γ, 0}, where d is the distance between
u and w, Γ is window size. Each sampled event contributes
a term to the local objective. Once enough events have been
sampled, an SGD step is performed to maximize the local
objective, and traversal continues to compute a new local
objective, initialized to 0. The resulting embeddings might
depend on the sampling order, which, in turn, depends on the
order of documents, but empirically this does not appear to be
the case [5]. Word2vec thus can be thought of as defining and
optimizing an objective over word cooccurrence counts. For
example, the sum of local objectives for SGNS would be [41]:
argmax
{ ∑
u,v∈D
{
Cu,v log σ (~wu · ~cv)−
∑
ri∈Ru,v
log σ (~wu · ~cri )
}}
,
(A.1)
where Ru,v ⊆ D are the “negative samples” taken for
the events that involve u, v throughout the epoch. Due to
its stochastic sampling, we consider SGNS’s cooccurrence
count for words u, v to be the expectation of the number of
their sampled cooccurrence events, which can be computed
similarly to GloVe’s sum of weights.
B. Optimization in cooccurrence-vector space (details)
This section details the algorithm from Section VI, whose
pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. The COMPDIFF sub-
procedure is not given in pseudo-code and we provide more
details on it below.
Implementation notes. The inner loop in lines 10-14 of
Algorithm 1 is entirely parallelizable, and we offload it to
a GPU. Further, to save GPU memory and latency of dis-
patching the computation onto the GPU, we truncate the high
dimensional vectors to include only the indices of the entries
Algorithm 1 Finding the change vector ∆̂
1: procedure SOLVEGREEDY(s ∈ D, POS,NEG ∈ ℘ (D), 〈t〉r, α,max∆ ∈ R)
2: |∆| ← 0
3: ∆̂← (0, ..., 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
×|D|
4: //precompute intermediate values
5: A← POS∪NEG∪{s}
6: STATE←
{
{∑r∈D Cu,r}u∈D,{‖ ~Mu‖22}u∈A,{ ~Ms· ~Mt}u∈A
}
7: J′ ← Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
8: //optimization loop
9: while J′ < 〈̂t〉r + α and |∆| ≤ max∆ do
10: for each i ∈ [|D|] , δ ∈ L do
11:
12: di,δ[Ĵ(s,NEG,POS;∆̂)],
{
di,δ [st]
}
st∈STATE ← COMPDIFF (i,δ,STATE)
13:
14: di,δ [|∆|]← δ/~ωi //see Section VII
15: i∗, δ∗ ← argmaxi∈[|D|],δ∈L
{
di,δ[Ĵ(s,NEG,POS;∆̂)]
di,δ [|∆|]
}
16: J′ ← J′ + di∗,δ∗
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
17: //update intermediate values
18: for each st ∈ STATE do
19: st← st+ di,δ [st]
20: return ∆̂
whose initial values are non-zero for at least one of the vectors{
~Mu
}
u∈POS∪NEG∪{s}
, as well as the indices of all target
words. When NEG = ∅, e.g. for all rank attackers, this
cannot change the algorithm’s output. Optimization will never
increase either of the removed entries in ~Ms, as this would
always result in a decrease in the objective. When NEG is not
empty, we do not remove the 10% of entries that correspond
to the most frequent words. These contain the vast majority
of the cooccurrence events, and optimization is most likely to
increase them and not the others.
This algorithm typically runs in minutes, as reported in
Section VIII.
The greedy approach is appropriate for objectives with dimin-
ishing returns. Our objective Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
performs
a log operation on entries of ∆̂ for computing the new (post-
attack) ~M ′s entries. We thus expect Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
to
have diminishing returns, i.e., we expect that as ∆̂ entries are
increased by our optimization procedure, increasing them fur-
ther will yield lower increases in corresponding ~M ′s entries,
and, resultantly, lower increases in Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
’s
value.
To test this intuition, we performed the following: dur-
ing each step of the optimization procedure, we recorded
the return values ∀i, δ : di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
, i.e.,
the increase in the objective that would occur by setting
∆̂i ← ∆̂i + δ. We counted the number of values that were
positive in the previous step, and the fraction of those values
that decreased or did not change in the current step (after
updating one of ∆̂’s entries). We averaged our samples across
the runs of the optimization procedure for the 100 word pairs
in Ωbenchmark. The number of iteration steps for a word pair
ranged from 8,000 to about 20,000, and we measure over the
first 10,000 steps.
Figure A.1 shows the results. We observe that the fraction
of decreasing return values is typically close to 1, which
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Figure A.1: The average fraction of diminishing returns in the first 10,000
iteration steps. The graph was smoothed by averaging over a 10-iteration
window. Parameters are the same as Figure A.2, but with ŝim = ŝim2.
is congruent with diminishing-returns behavior. As iterations
advance, some di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
entries become
very small, and numerical computation errors might explain
why the fraction becomes lower.
In Appendix C we explain the theoretical guarantee at-
tained when using submodular objectives, which are defined
by having diminishing returns. With these objectives, our
greedy approach is provably effective. While our objective
is not analytically shown to be submodular, we conjecture
that the greedy algorithm is particularly appropriate, due to
its diminishing returns property.
The COMPDIFF sub-procedure. the input is i, δ, and the
saved intermediate computation states. The state contains (1)
the dot product of s’s distributional vector ~Ms with those of
the target words in POS∪NEG; (2) the squared L2 norms of
the source and target words’ distributional vectors, and (3) for
every word, the sum of its cooccurrence counts with all other
words.
We use the following notations: we denote by C ′ def=
C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂] the cooccurrence matrix after adding ∆̂ to
~Cs.
We similarly denote the updated bias terms by B′ and the
updated distributional matrix by M ′. We define f ′ as f
computed using the updated bias terms {B′u}u∈D, instead
of {Bu}u∈D. Finally, let X̂ a distributional expression that
depends on ∆̂, then let
[
X̂
]
i,δ
def
= X̂ + di,δ
[
X̂
]
, i.e., the
value of the expression after setting ∆̂i ← ∆̂i + δ.
The first step is to compute the updated cooccurrence sums[∑
r∈D C
′
u,r
]
i,δ
for u ∈ {s, i} ∪ POS∪NEG, by adding
δ to the appropriate sums (for example,
[∑
r∈D C
′
s,r
]
i,δ
is
always updated, since we always add cooccurrences with the
source word). Next, using the updated cooccurrence sums, we
compute the updated bias terms [B′u]i,δ for u ∈ {s, i} ∪
POS∪NEG. For SPPMI, these terms also depend on log (Z)
(see Section IV-B), which is not a part of our state, but changes
in this term are negligible. For BIAS, we use an approximation
explained below.
Using the above, we can compute[
f ′s,t
(∑
r∈D C
′
u,r, e
−60)]
i,δ
for u ∈ {s} ∪POS∪NEG and[
f ′s,t (C
′
s,t, 0)
]
i,δ
.
Now, we compute the updates to our saved intermediate
state. First, we compute di,δ
[
~M ′si
]
, i.e., the difference in
~M ′s’s ith entry. This is similar to the previous computation,
since matrix entries are computed using f ′. We use these val-
ues, along with
(
~M ′s · ~M ′t
)
, which is a part of our saved state,
to compute
[(
~M ′s · ~M ′t
)]
i,δ
←
(
~M ′s · ~M ′t
)
+di,δ
[
~M ′si
]
·Mti
for each target. If i ∈ POS∪NEG, we also add a similar term
accounting for di,δ
[
~M ′ts
]
. We similarly derive di,δ
[
~M ′s
2
i
]
and use it to compute
[∥∥∥ ~M ′s∥∥∥2
2
]
i,δ
←
∥∥∥ ~M ′s∥∥∥2
2
+ di,δ
[
~M ′s
2
i
]
.
If i ∈ POS∪NEG, we similarly compute
[∥∥∥ ~M ′i∥∥∥2
2
]
i,δ
. For
SPPMI, the above does not account for minor changes in bias
values of the source or target which might affect all entries of
vectors in
{
~M ′u
}
u∈{s}∪POS∪NEG
. We could avoid carrying
the approximation error to the next step (at a minor, non-
asymptotical performance hit) by changing Algorithm 1 to
recompute the state from the updated cooccurrences at each
step, instead of the updates at lines 18-19, but our current
implementation does not.
Now we are ready to compute the differences in
ŝim’1 (s, t) , ŝim’2 (s, t) , ŝim’1+2 (s, t), the distributional ex-
pressions for the first-order, second-order, and combined prox-
imities, respectively, using C[[s]← ~Cs+∆̂]. For each target:
di,δ
[̂
sim’1 (s, t)
]
←
{ [f′s,t (C′s,t, 0)]i,δ√[
f′s,t
(∑
r C
′s,r, e−60
)]
i,δ
[
f′s,t
(∑
r C
′
t,r, e
−60)]
i,δ
−
f′s,t
(
C′s,t, 0
)
√
f′s,t
(∑
r C
′s,r, e−60
)
f′s,t
(∑
r C
′
t,r, e
−60)
}
di,δ
[
ŝim’2 (s, t)
]
←
[
~M ′s · ~M ′t
]
i,δ√[∥∥∥ ~M ′s∥∥∥2
2
]
i,δ
[∥∥∥ ~M ′t∥∥∥2
2
]
i,δ
−
~M ′s · ~M ′t√∥∥∥ ~M ′s∥∥∥2
2
∥∥∥ ~M ′t∥∥∥2
2
and, using the above,
di,δ
[
ŝim’1+2 (s, t)
]
←
di,δ
[
ŝim’1 (s, t)
]
+ di,δ
[
ŝim’2 (s, t)
]
2
Finally, we compute di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
as
di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
← 1|POS∪NEG| ·( ∑
t∈POS
di,δ
[
ŝim∆̂ (s, t)
]
−
∑
t∈NEG
di,δ
[
ŝim∆̂ (s, t)
])
We return di,δ
[
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)]
and the computed
differences in the saved intermediate values.
Estimating biases. When the distributional proximities in
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
are computed using M = BIAS, there
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is an additional subtlety. We compute BIAS using the biases
output by GloVe when trained on the original corpus. Changes
to the cooccurrences might affect biases computed on the
modified corpus. This effect is likely insignificant for small
modifications to the cooccurrences of the existing words. New
words introduced as part of the attack do not initially have
biases, and, during optimization, one can estimate their post-
attack biases using the average biases of the words with the
same cooccurrence counts in the existing corpus. In practice,
we found that post-retraining BIAS distributional distances
closely follow our estimated ones (see Figure A.2–b).
C. Approximation guarantee for submodular objectives
In this section we show that, under simplifying assumptions,
the greedy approach attains an approximation guarantee.
Simplifying assumptions. Most importantly, we will assume
that a proxy function defined using our explicit objective
Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
is a submodular function (see below
for the formal statement). This is not true in practice, how-
ever, the objective is characterized by having diminishing
returns, which are the defining property of submodular func-
tions (see Appendix B). We also assume for simplicity that
|∆| =
∥∥∥∆̂∥∥∥
1
(this is true up to a multiplicative constant,
except when using ŝim = ŝim1+2), that in Algorithm 1
we set L ← {1/5}, and that ∆̂ is limited to the domain
A def= {x ∈ R | ∃j ∈ N : x = (1/5)j} (entries are limited to
the ones our algorithm can find due to the definition of L).
Definition 1. Let S a finite set. Then a submodular set function
is a function υ : P (S) → R such that for any (X,Y ) ⊆ S
with X ⊆ Y , for every x ∈ S \ Y it holds that:
υ (X ∪ {x})− υ (X) ≥ υ (Y ∪ {x}) + υ (Y )
Let u ∈ D be a word, and Wu = {u1, ..., u1000000}5 a set
of elements corresponding to u. We define S = ⋃u∈DWu.
We define a mapping ξ between subsets of S and change
vectors, by (ξ (X))u
def
= ((1/5) |Wu ∩ S|). Let φ (X) def=
Ĵ (s,NEG,POS; ξ (X)).
Theorem 1. Assume that φ is nonnegative, monotone increas-
ing in ∆̂ entries within A, and submodular. Let SOLJ be
the increase in Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
attained by the prox-
imity attacker with ŝim2, using the singleton variant. Let
OPTJ
def
= max∆̂∈A,|∆|≤max∆ Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
be the
value attained in the optimal solution where A is defined as
above. Then:
SOLJ ≥ (1− 1/e)OPTJ
Proof. We will rely on well-known results for the following
greedy algorithm.
Definition 2. The GREEDYSET(υ, cn) algorithm operates on
a function υ : P (S) → R, and a constraint cn : P (S) →
5The theorems we rely on require that the set be finite; we choose it as big
enough such that in practice it is equivalent to an infinite set.
{T, F}. The algorithm is as follows: (1) initiates X ← ∅, and
(2) iteratively sets X ← X ∪ {argmaxe∈S (υ (X ∪ {e}))}6
until cn (X) = F , and (3) then returns X \ {e} where e is
the last chosen element.
This algorithm has several guarantees when υ is nonnega-
tive, monotone, and submodular. Particularly, for cardinality
constraints, of the form |X| ≤ T , we know [53] that the
algorithm attains a (1− 1/e) multiplicative approximation for
the highest possible value of υ (X) under the constraint, which
we denote by OPTυ(X).
We analyze the following algorithm, which is equivalent to
Algorithm 1: For the proximity attacker, we run GREEDYSET
on φ with a cardinality constraint (1/5) |X| ≤ max∆. We
output ξ (X) where X is GREEDYSET’s output.
Claim 1. Let OPTφ(X) be the optimal solution for maximizing
φ (X) with a cardinality constraint (1/5) |X| ≤ max∆. Then
OPTφ(X) = OPTJ .
Let X be the solution such that φ (X) = OPTφ(X) and
(1/5) |X| ≤ max∆. Since φ (X) = Ĵ (s,NEG,POS; ξ (X))
and |∆| = (1/5) |X| ≤ max∆, we have that OPTφ(X) ≤
OPTJ .
Let ∆̂ the solution such that Ĵ (s,NEG,POS; ξ (X)) =
OPTJ . Again, we use the fact that ξ
(
ξ−1
(
∆̂
))
= ∆̂ and get
that Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ξ
(
ξ−1
(
∆̂
)))
= OPTJ . Moreover,∣∣∣ξ−1 (∆̂)∣∣∣ = 5 · |∆|, so (1/5) ∣∣∣ξ−1 (∆̂)∣∣∣ ≤ max∆. Thus,
OPTφ(X) ≥ OPTJ .
Theorem 1 directly follows from the claim and the above-
mentioned approximation guarantee due to Nemhauser and
Wolsey [53].
D. Placement strategy (details)
As discussed in Section VII, our attack involves adding two
types of sequences to the corpus.
First-order sequences. For each t ∈ POS, to increase ŝim1
by the required amount, we add sequences with exactly one
instance of s and t each until the number of sequences is equal
to
⌈
∆̂t/γ (1)
⌉
, where γ is the cooccurrence-weight function.
We could leverage the fact that γ can count multiple cooc-
currences for each instance of s, but this has disadvantages.
Adding more occurrences of the target word around s is
pointless because they would exceed those of s and dominate
|∆|, particularly for pure ŝim1 attackers with just one target
word.7 We thus require symmetry between the occurrences of
the target and source words.
Sequences of the form s t s t . . . could increase the desired
extra cooccurrences per added source (or target) word by
a factor of 2-3 in our setting (depending on how long the
6Ties in argmax are broken arbitrarily.
7This strategy might be good when using ŝim1+2 or when
|POS∪NEG| > 1, because occurrences of s exceed those of t to
begin with, but only under the assumption that adding many cooccurrences
of target word with itself does not impede the attack. In this paper, we do
not explore further if the attack can be improved in these specific cases.
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sequences are). Nevertheless, they are clearly anomalous and
would result in a fragile attack. For example, in our Twitter
corpus, sub-sequences of the form X Y X Y where X 6= Y
and X,Y are alpha-numeric words, occur in 0.03% of all
tweets. Filtering out such rare sub-sequences would eliminate
100% of the attacker’s first-order sequences.
We could also merge t’s first-order appearances with those
of other targets, or inject t into second-order sequences next to
s. This would add many cooccurrences of t with words other
than s and might decrease both ŝim1 (s, t) and ŝim2 (s, t).
Second-order sequences. We add 11-word sequences that
include the source word s and 5 additional on each side of
s. Our placement strategy forms these sequences so that the
cooccurrences of u ∈ D\POS with s are approximately equal
to those in the change vector ∆̂u. This has a collateral effect of
adding cooccurrences of u with words other than s, but it does
not affect ŝim1 (s, t), nor ŝim2 (s, t). Moreover, it is highly
unlikely to affect the distributional proximities of the added
words u 6∈ POS∪{s} with other words since, in practice,
every such word is added at most a few times.
We verified this using one of our benchmark experi-
ments from Section VIII. For solutions found with ŝim =
SIM2,M = BIAS, |∆| = 1250, only about 0.3% of such
entries ∆̂u were bigger than 20, and, for 99% of them, the
change in
∥∥∥ ~Cu∥∥∥
1
was less than 1%. We conclude that changes
to ~Cu where u is neither the source nor the target have
negligible effects on distributional proximities.
Placement algorithm. Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo-code of
our placement algorithm. It constructs a list of sequences, each
with 2 · λ+ 1 words for some λ (in our setting, 5), with s in
the middle, λth slot. Since the sum of s’s cooccurrences in
each such sequence is 2
∑
d∈[λ] γ (d), we require a minimum
of
(∑
u∈D\POS
{
∆̂u
})
/
∑
d∈[λ] γ (d) sequences.
After instantiating this many sequences, the algorithm tra-
verses ∆̂’s entries and, for each, inserts the corresponding
word into the non-yet-full sequences until the required number
of cooccurrences is reached. For every such insertion, it tries
to find the slot whose contribution to the cooccurrence count
most tightly fits the needed value. After all sequences are filled
up, a new one is added. In the end, sequences that still have
empty slots are filled by randomly chosen words that have
nonzero entries in ∆̂ (but are not in POS). We found that this
further improves the distributional objective without increasing
|∆|. Finally, ∆ is added to the corpus.
Properties required in Section VII hold. First, assume that
∆̂ has entries corresponding to either first- or second-order
sequences but not both. Observe that in our |∆|, s is always
the word with the most occurrences, and it occurs in each
sequence once. Therefore, |∆| is always equal to the number
of sequences and the number of source-word occurrences in
∆ (see the definition of |∆| in Section V).
For ∆̂ with only first-order changes, both properties trivially
hold, because we add
⌈
∆̂t/γ (1)
⌉
cooccurrences of the source
and the target. The size of the change is thus predictable, as
it adds almost exactly ∆̂s to |∆|.
For second-order changes, both properties empirically hold.
First, |∆| is still linear in
∣∣∣∆̂∣∣∣: their Pearson correlation is over
0.99 for the rank attacker in Section IX, where |∆| varies.
Thus, |∆| is a constant multiple of
∣∣∣∆̂∣∣∣ and close to optimal.
For example, it is about 4 times smaller than
∥∥∥∆̂∥∥∥
1
for the
GloVe attack, the optimal value being 2
∑
d∈[λ] γ (d) ≈ 4.5.
Second, for the proximity attacker in Section VIII, where
|∆| is constant but Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
varies, we measured
>0.99 Pearson correlation between the proximities attained
by Ĵ
(
s,NEG,POS; ∆̂
)
and those computed over the actual,
post-placement cooccurrence counts (see Figure A.2–a).
If ∆̂ contains both first- and second-order entries (because
the objective uses ŝim1+2), the aggregate contribution to
the cooccurrence counts still preserves the objective’s value
because it separately preserves its ŝim1 and ŝim2 components.
We can still easily compute |∆| via their weighted sum (e.g.,
divide second-order entries by 4 and first-order entries by 1).
Algorithm 2 Placement into corpus: finding the change set ∆
1: procedure PLACEADDITIONS(vector ∆̂, word s)
2: ∆← ∅
3: for each t ∈ POS do // First, add first-order sequences
4: ∆← ∆ ∪ {“s t′′, ..., “s t′′}︸ ︷︷ ︸
×d∆̂t/γ(1)e
5: // Now deal with second-order sequences
6: changeMap←
{
u→ ∆̂u | ∆̂u 6= 0 ∧ u 6∈ POS
}
7: minSequencesRequired←
⌈∑
u∈D\POS ∆̂u∑
d∈[λ] γ(d))
⌉
8: live← {”_ _ _ _ s _ _ _ _”, ..., ”_ _ _ _ s _ _ _ _”}︸ ︷︷ ︸
×minSequencesRequired
9: indices← {−5,−4,−3,−2,−1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
10:
11: for each u ∈ changeMap do
12: while changeMap [u] > 0 do
13: seq, i← argmin seq∈live,
i∈indices
s.t.seq[i]=”_”
∣∣∣γ (|i|)− changeMap [u] ∣∣∣
14: seq [i]← u
15: changeMap [u]← changeMap [u]− γ (|i|)
16: if ∀i ∈ indices : seq [i] 6= ”_” then
17: ∆← ∆ ∪ {seq}
18: live← live \ {seq}
19: if live = ∅ then
20: live← {”_ _ _ _ s _ _ _ _”}
21: // Fill empty sequences with nonzero ∆̂ entries
22: for each seq ∈ live do
23: for each i ∈ {i ∈ indices | seq [i] = ”_”} do
24: seq {i} ← RandomChoose ({u ∈ changeMap})
25:
26: ∆← ∆ ∪ {seq}
return ∆
E. Distributional distances are good proxies
Figure A.2 shows how distributional distances computed
during the attack are preserved throughout placement (Fig-
ure A.2–a), re-training by the victim (Figure A.2–b), and, fi-
nally, in the new embedding (Figure A.2–c). The latter depicts
how increases in distributional proximity correspond roughly
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(a) Post-placement distributional proximities (b) Post-retraining distributional proximities (c) Final embedding proximities
Figure A.2: Comparing the proxy distances used by the attacker with the post-attack distances in the corpus for the words in Ωbenchmark , using GloVe-
paper/Wikipedia, M = BIAS, ŝim = ŝim1+2,max∆ = 1250.
linearly to increases in embedding proximity, indicating that
the former is an effective proxy for the latter.
F. Alternative attack on resume search
In this section, we consider an attacker who—instead of
poisoning the embedding—changes his resume to include
words from the expanded queries. Specifically, he adds the
closest neighbor of t in the original embedding to his resume
so that it is returned in response to queries where t ∈ Ωsearch.
First, this attacker must add a specific meaningful word to
his resume. For example, to match the K = 1 expanded query
“iOS,” the attacker needs to add “Android” to his resume,
but this involves claiming that he actually has expertise in
Android. By contrast, our embedding attack adds a made-up
string, e.g., a social media handle or nickname.
Further, this attack significantly underperforms our embed-
ding attack. We carried out an experiment similar to Sec-
tion IX, but for each target word t, we randomly chose a single
resume and added to it t’s nearest neighbor in the original
embedding. We did not poison 20 resumes, as this would have
turned t’s nearest neighbor into a common word, decreasing
its score. Query expansion uses the original embedding. For
comparison, we repeated our experiment from Section IX, but
modifying just one resume per t ∈ Ωsearch.
The embedding attacker outperforms the alternative attacker
for every K ∈ {1, 2, 3} and every query type. Averaged over
query types and K values, the average and median ranks
attained by the embedding attacker are 2.5 times lower (i.e.,
better) than the alternative attacker’s.
G. Attack with deletions
We now consider an attacker who can delete cooccurrence
events from the corpus. While this is a stronger threat model,
we find that it does not dramatically improve the trade-
off between the size of the changes to the corpus and the
corresponding changes in distributional proximity.
Supporting deletions requires some changes.
Attacker. First, corpus changes now include events that
correspond to a decrease in cooccurrence counts. We define
∆ = ∆add ∪ ∆rm where ∆add are the sentences added by
the attacker (as before), and ∆rm are the cooccurrence events
deleted by the attacker.
The modified corpus C+∆ is now defined as C augmented
with ∆add and with the word appearances in ∆rm flipped to
randomly chosen words. A word flip does not delete a cooc-
currence event per se but replaces it by another cooccurrence
event between s and some randomly chosen word u. These are
almost equivalent in terms of their effect on the distributional
proximities because cooccurrence vectors are very sparse. In
our Wikipedia corpus, for a random subsample of 50,000 most
common words, we found that on average 1% of the entries
were non-zero. It is thus highly likely that Cs,u is initially
0 or very low. If so, then Ms,u is likely 0 and will likely
remain 0 (due to the max operation in all of our candidate
M—see Section IV-B) even after we add this cooccurrence
event. Therefore, the effect of a word flip on distributional
proximities is similar to word removal.
Let de be the distance of the removed word from s
for e ∈ ∆rm. Let |∆rm| def=
∑
e∈∆rm γ (de) be the sum
of cooccurrence-event weights of ∆rm. We similarly define
|∆add| as the weighted sum of cooccurrence events added
to the corpus by ∆add. Under the ŝim2 attacker, where ~ω
entries are identical, and using our placement strategy, the
definition of |∆add| is equivalent to the definition of |∆|, up
to multiplication by the value of ~ω entries.
We redefine |∆| as |∆add|+β |∆rm|. Under this definition,
word-flip deletions that are close to s cost more to the attacker
in terms of increasing |∆|. β is this cost.
Optimization in cooccurrence-vector space. We modify the
optimization procedure from Section VI as follows. First,
we set L ← [−5, 4] ∩ {i/5 | i ∈ Z6=0}. This allows the
optimization to add negative values to the entries in the
cooccurrence change vector and to output ∆̂ with negative
entries. Second, we apply a different weight to the negative
values by multiplying the computed “step cost” value by β
(line 14 of Algorithm 1).
Placement strategy. We modify the placement strategy from
Section VII as follows. First, we set ∆̂pos ← max
{
∆̂, 0
}
(for the element-wise max operation) and use ∆̂pos as input
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s− t additions only additions & deletions
war-peace 0.219480 0.219480
freedom-slavery 0.253640 0.253636
ignorance-strength 0.266967 0.264050
Table XIV: Attained ŝim1+2 (s, t) proximity with and without deletions.
to the original placement Algorithm 2. Then, we set ∆̂neg ←
min {x, 0} for an element-wise min operation. We traverse
the corpus to find cooccurrence events between s and another
word u such that ∆̂negu is non-zero. Whenever we find such an
event, u’s location in the corpus is saved into ∆rm. We then
subtract from ∆̂negu the weight of this cooccurrence event.
Evaluation. We use three source-target pairs—war-peace,
freedom-slavery, ignorance-strength—with β = 1. We attack
GloVe-tutorial trained on Wikipedia with window size of
5 using a distance attacker, ws set to the source word in each
pair, POS to ws only, and max∆ = 1000. We also perform
an identically parameterized attack without deletions.
Table XIV shows the results. They are almost identical, with
a slight advantage to the attacker who can use deletions.
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